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CASES NOTED
ing to accept compensation, 2' need not find himself at the mercy of the
employer or compensation insurer, as he did prior to the amendment. 22
In the past the employee was frequently forced to accept compensation
in order to pay debts that had arisen from the injury. Because of the elec-
tion he might find himself dealing with an insurance carrier, who was not
only the compensation carrier, but who also carried the liability insurance
for the third person. When a situation of this nature would arise, the carrier
would be interested in settling for or collecting the smallest sum possible,
provided the amount recovered amounted to the extent of its payment as
compensation insurer to the injured employee. Now, without forfeiting his
compensation benefits, the employee may attempt to be fully compensated
in damages from the third person, including such elements of damage as pain
and suffering, mental anguish or loss of consortium, which are not covered
by the Workmen's Compensation Law.23
TORTS - DETERMINATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
UNDER FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A United States Army corporal stationed on Guam was issued a trip
ticket authorizing him to use a weapons carrier for official business. The
corporal used the vehicle for unofficial purposes and injured plaintiff. Held,
that under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' to determine the scope of employ-
ment the courts look to Federal law and decisions. Local law is used only
to determine tort liability. Williams v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 208
(N.D. Cal. 1952).
The purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act2 is to give persons having
claims against the United States the right to bring suit.8 The difficulty
arises in the interpretation of Section 1346(b), which allows claims where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.'I
It is accepted that local law should be used to determine the negligence of
the governmental employee,5 but the courts differ as to which law determines
21. See note 5 supra.
22. For analysis of FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1951) prior to amendment see Note, 1 U.
OF FLA. L. REv. 278-283 (1948).
23. FLA. STAT. c. 440 (1951).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946). The district courts . . . shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions . . . against the United States . . . arising from . . . the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United Statcs, if a
private person would be liable to the claimant in accord with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
3. United States v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
5. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1949); United States v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d
239 (4th Cir. 1951).
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the master-servant relationship. Every tort action against the United States
involves this relationship. The following rules have been promulgated.
They are: first, federal decisional law should determine respondeat superior;'
second, the act itself (with reference to armed services) in a subsequent
section,7 defines the relationship; third, local law should determine the
scope of employment without using peculiar local remedial law; and fourth,
local law should be used without qualification. 10
The advocates of the first theory have said that the act' itself expressly
requires federal, rather than local law, to determine the naster-servant rela-
tionship.12 Another rationale of this theory held there was no express dec-
laration on the point but that it was not reasonable to suppore that Congress
intended to subject internal relationships (of the anued forces) to the law
of negligence as laid down by the courts of the several states. 13 The United
States Supreme Court held that diversity of state laws and defenses to
respondeat superior led it to adopt a uniform system of federal decisional law
rather than a "hodge-podge" of conflicting local law.'4 The same Court
disallowed the applicability of Erie v. Tompkins and held that it had no
effect to bring within the governance of state law matters exclusively federal.
No relationship between the government and its citizens is more distinctively
federal than that between it and members of the armed services.' 6
With reference to the second rule other courts were content to say that
Section 2671 of the Act' 7 resolved the question.' 8 This section states that
acting within the scope of employment as applied to military or naval
forces means acting within the line of duty and the courts looked to Army
Regulations 10 to define "within the line of duty." 20
6. Fetes v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1949); United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301 (1947); United States v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1951); Jefferson v.
United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1946) (acting within the scope of his office or employment
in the case of a member of the military forces of the United States, means acting in the
line of duty).
8. Cannon v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1949). Cerri v. United
States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948); Rutherford v. United States, 73 F. Supp.
867 (E.D. Tenn. 1947).
9. Long v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Kohn v. United States,
75 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
10. Murphey v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v.
Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949); Olson v. United States, 175 F.2d 510 (8th Cir.
1949); Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949); United States v. Campbell,
172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
12. United States v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1951).
13. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
14. Fetes v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1949).
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1946).
18. Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948); Rutherford v. United
States, 73 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Tenn. 1947).
19. Sections 40-590.
20. Cannon v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
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In adopting local law under the third rule to determine the relationship,
some courts were hesitant to incorporate all local remedial law in conflict
with the Act itself.21 Local remedial law, such as the "permissive use" stat-
utes,22 was held to be outside the intent of the Congress, and claims arising
under local law imposing liability upon an employer for conduct of an
employee outside the scope of his employment were not embraced within the
waiver of sovereign immunity.23
Proponents of the last rule, that all local law should be applied, claim
that the purpose of the act is to make the United States liable to third peD
sons for acts of its employees under the same circumstances as those under
which private persons would be liable for the same acts of their employees,
in full accordance with the law of the place where the injury occurred. There
can be no liability of the federal government unless the employee was both
negligent and within the scope of his employment, and that entire "liability"
under the act must be predicated on the "liability" of the law of the place
where the injury occurred. 24
The first view is the most widely followed, yet it seems the least sound.
The courts in support cite Tarbles Case2 5 which reiterates the independent
nature of the governments of the states and the government of the United
States as to their respective spheres of action. Other cases analogize deci-
sions on the National Bank Act, which was held to be only federal in nature,
and therefore not within the puriew of state law. 25  In both instances,
however, there is no statute which expressly creates liability in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or the omission occurred.2 These
courts plead "uniformity of decisions" ' 28 in relation to respondeat superior,
yet in the same plea admit that state law should determine negligence.
There is as much, if not more, diversity in the law of negligence as there is
in the law governing the master-servant relationship. It is claimed that the
relationship between the government and members of its arined forces is
distinctively federal in character;20 but all relationships involved in the fed-
eral employment are distinctively federal in this sense. Certainly the Tort
Claims Act does not expressly make such a distinction.
If the United States is to be liable the employee must be both negligent
21. Kohn v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
22. CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE § 402 (1935).
23. Long v. United States, 78 11. Supp. 35 (SD. Cal. 1948).
24. Murphey v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v.
Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949); Olson v. United States, 175 F.2d 510 (8th Cir.
1949); Hubseh v. United States, 174 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949); United States v. Campbell,
172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949).
25. 13 Wall. 397 (1871).
26. National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S.
289 (1941); Deitrich v. Creanery, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
28. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1949).
29. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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and within the scope of his employment. The statute, in imposing liability,
did not divorce the master-servant relationship from the negligence liability.
The act says liability "according to the law of the place"30 and the courts
ought to so enforce it. If the courts deem it an incursion into the federal
sphere, the remedy lies with Congress and not in judicial legislation.
TORTS-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTE-STATUS OF
UNLAWFULLY EMPLOYED MINOR
Parents of deceased nine-year-old unlawfully' employed child brought
an action under the wrongful death statute.2 Defendant pleaded that the
exclusive remedy is under the Workmen's Compensation Statute.3  Held,
a child who could not be lawfully employed is not an employee under the
Workmen's Compensation Statute,4 and therefore, the action under the
wrongful death statute is not barred. Smith v. Arnold, 60 So.2d 281
(Fla. 1952).
There are essentially three different types of statutory provisions
relating to minors in the existing workmen's compensation laws.' In the
first category, only minors who are legally permitted to work are included.
The courts generally hold that the child's employment must not violate
any child labor law provision in order to come under the actY The second
type of statute does not mention minors specificially but includes all
employees under a contract of hire.' Though some courts at first were
reluctant to include minors illegally employed,8 the tendency has been to
include them because there exists a voidable contract of employment which
a minor, who has committed no wrong, may assert for his own benefit.'
Other courts add that minors should be entitled to the beneficial effects
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
1. FLA. STAT. § 450.03 (1951).
2. FLA, STAT. §§ 768.01, 768.02, 768.03 (1951).
3. FLA. STAT. C. 440; § 440.11 (1951).
4. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (2) (1951) (which defines employee as "including minors
whether lawfully or unlawfully employed).
5. See Comment, Recovery Under Workmen's Comp. Act for Death of a Minor, 7
MONT. L. REV. 82 (1946).
6. Messmer v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 562, 118 N.E. 993 (1918); Kruczkowski v.
Polonia Publishing Co., 203 Mich. 211, 168 N.W. 932 (1918); Westerlund v. Kettle
River Co., 137 Minn. 24, 162 N.W. 680 (1917); Acklin Stamping Co. v. Kutz, 98 Ohio
St. 61, 120 N.E. 229 (1918); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 P.2d 885
(Utah 1945) (minor working in a prohibited occupation).
7. See note 5 supra.
8. Widdoes v. Laub, 33 Del. 4, 129 At]. 344 (1925); Sechlich v. Harris-Emery Co.,
184 Iowa 1025, 169 N.W. 325 (1918); Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 89 N.J.L. 205,
98 Atl. 308 (1916); Rock Island Coal Mining Co. v. Gilliam, 89 Okla. 49, 213 Pac. 833(1923); Gilley v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 35 S.W. 136 (Texas 1931) (employment contract
in violation of child labor law not valid).
9. Greenberg v. Guliano, 131 Conn. 157, 38 A.2d 436 (1944); Pierce's Case, 267
Mass. 140, 166 N.E. 636 (1929); Noreen v. William Vogel and Bros., 231 N.Y. 317,
132 N.E. 102 (1921); Kociolowiz v. Tonawanda Corrugated Box Co., 252 App. Div. 716,
